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Oil has acquired a dominant position with respect to 
the world energy supply. This is not due to its long term 
abundance prospects. It is because of the outstanding ease 
of its utilization, and also because of an exceptional low 
cost of production owing to exceptional geological and 
political conditions. In fact, these conditions, which led to 
the post-World War II oil boom, were restricted to a small 
region (2 percent of the world's surface area) and to a mere 
decade, the 1960s: an instant in human history.
So the reality looks like this: our civilization depends 
heavily on oil. Because of the difficulties and the time 
needed to shift to other energy sources, it is of the utmost 
importance that we assess how long the oil era will or can 
last. This paper expresses a few thoughts on the subject.
Before analyzing oil resources assessments and poten- 
tial for the 21st Century, we would like to put forthcoming 
estimates in a special perspective: How much oil or liquid 
fuels will, or would, we need? This is indeed not an easy 
question. In trying to answer it, we are confronted with a 
great many uncertainties. First of all, we should know how 
many people will be on Earth 50 or 100 years from now, 
and what their life-style will be like. Although the whole 
problem is a fascinating one, we are in fact concerned here 
mainly with the specific aspect mentioned above: How 
much oil, or liquid fuels, could be needed? Basic assump- 
tions which we have made at IIASA in order to attempt to 
give a preliminary answer are: first, that the world popula- 
tion will be stabilized (say, at less than 12 billion people or 
3 times the present level; possibly between 7 and 9 billion 
people); second, that energy needs also be stabilized, or in- 
creasing very slowly (this is in contrast with some other 
forecasts of ever increasing energy demand); and third, 
that oil and other liquid fuels will be reserved for transpor- 
tation (there will be a limit to the number of cars and 
potential mileage), petrochemicals (but other raw 
materials, such as coal or biomass, will compete), and 
development phase of the Less Developed Countries.
It is often mentioned that "oil must be reserved for 
transportation and petrochemicals." In fact, with a pro- 
gressive shift to the supply of heavier crudes, it is not clear 
what the maximum yield of light or intermediate products 
could be.
All in all, we came to a consumption figure of between 
3 and 5 billion tons of oil per year. This seems a reasonable
1 Part of this work has been performed with the support of the Electric Power Research In- 
stitute.
value. However, more of other liquid fuels (synfuels) could 
be produced and consumed because of their convenience 
or preference for them. Curiously, this consumption figure 
is also an often quoted maximum for world oil production 
supposed to occur in the 1990's (the Central Intelligence 
Agency of the United States, the Workshop on Alternative 
Energy Strategies) and in most oil companies' studies as 
shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1 Potential world oil production curve, in billions of 
tons.
Our point of view for looking at the oil resources and 
(or) liquid fuels is thus to consider how long resources 
could allow a plateau of oil production and consumption 
to continue (fig. 1) and, in view of potential resources, 
what should possibly be done to maintain such a level of 
production. In other words, we challenge the bell-shaped 
production curve shown in figure 1.
ASSESSMENTS OF CONVENTIONAL WORLD OIL 
RESOURCES
We do not have good tools with which to tackle our 
problems. Unfortunately, world oil resources are very 
poorly known. Because so many important energy policy 
decisions are founded on so fragile a basis, it is important 
to understand why and, hopefully, to aim to correct this 
uncomfortable situation to make the poorly known well- 
known.
We have emphasized, as shown in figure 2, some of 
the differences between reserves and resources that can 
help us to understand better why we know so little about 
resources. Generally, the interest in reserves has been very 
great, but there was, until recently, little or no interest in 
resources. The time horizon for reserves is between 10 and
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RESERVES RESOURCES
Interest in ______ Great
Time horizon ___ 
Economic aspect
10-30 years 
Must be profitable
Estimated by ____ Industry
Data
Methods
More or less reliable, 
conservative, 
"proprietary," 
and exploitation- 
oriented
Industrial work 
(expensive): 
exploration, 
drilling, and 
measurements
None in the past, now
emerging
Long or very long term 
Non-profitable today,
"science-fiction"
technology 
Member of industry or
government
(institutions) 
Uncertain or
speculative, but
scientifically
oriented
Paper or computer 
work: "geological", 
"historical"
Figure 2 Reserves compared to resources.
30 years, and for resources it is long or very long term. 
What we, at IIASA, call the long or very long term is at least 
from 20 to 50 years after the year 2000, say until the year 
2050 or even later, clearly into the 21st Century.
From the economic point of view, reserves must be 
"profitable". This is a very important point because, in 
fact, we have not redefined, since the oil crisis of 1973, the 
meaning of the word "profitable". Is a reserve "profitable 
for industry" (which was essentially the case up to now)? Is 
a reserve "profitable for a country"? This question can 
have a big influence on the revision of our estimates of 
reserves and (or) resources. Traditionally and by defini- 
tion, resources are either not profitable or are unknown, 
and estimates even sometimes rely on what industry calls 
"science-fiction technology," that is, technologies still to be 
developed and matured. However, the border line between 
reserves and resources is sometimes very thin. For in- 
stance, if the British Government were to change its taxa- 
tion policy only slightly and find it "profitable" to do so, 
so-called "marginal reserves" (currently in the 50 to 100 
million barrels range) would become commercially 
producible.
Estimates of reserves are generally made by industry 
(they are its daily bread). Estimates of resources have been 
made by members of the industry (most often on a hobby 
basis, because it is not their main occupation) or by 
government or scientific institutions. It follows that 
estimates of reserves are more or less reliable, conser- 
vative, proprietary, and exploitation oriented. Methods of 
obtaining these data are expensive and include exploration 
and drilling. On the other hand, resource estimates are 
uncertain or speculative, more theoretically oriented, and 
based on paper work, now also on computer work.
If we look at these many differences, I think that we 
already understand why the reserves are much better 
known than the resources. Starting from this point of 
view, we at IIASA have devoted much attention to the 
various world oil resources assessments and have tried to
understand them better. A summary of our studies was 
first presented at the meeting of the American Association 
of Petroleum Geologists in Houston, Texas, April 1-4, 
1979.
Some lists of world oil resources assessments during 
the past 25 or 30 years have been published. We have also 
made our own list of these mostly well-known estimates 
(fig. 3). We have listed only the results we have been able 
to find in published papers, because sometimes reference is 
made to an estimate we are not able to document. Our 
tabulation gives the name of the estimator and his com- 
pany, which is an often underestimated factor. Where ap- 
plicable, we have also put the estimate for the United 
States. When two values are given with a slash it is because 
the estimator himself has given two values. For instance, 
Weeks has generally calculated two values, for "primary"
ESTIMATOR, 
AFFILIATION, 
AND YEAR
ESTIMATE OF 
TOTAL BARRELS
U.S.
PART OF 
TOTAL
U.S.
PART OF 
PERCENT
Duce
(ARAMCO, 1946)___ 500 100 20
Pogue
(N.A., 1946)______ 615 
Weeks
(JERSEY, 1948) ____ 617 
Levorsen
(STANFORD, 1949)_ 1,635
Weeks
(JERSEY, 1949) ____ 1,015 
Weeks
(JERSEY, 1958) ____ 1,500/3,000* 240 16
Weeks
(N.A., 1959)______ 2,000/3,500* 270/460* 14
Hendricks
(USGS, 1965)______ 1,984/2,480* 320/400* 16
Weeks
(WEEKS, 1968) ____ 2,200/3,550* 
Hubbert
(USGS, 1969)______ (1,350-2,000)**
Moody
(MOBIL, 1970)____ 1,800
Warman
(B.P., 1971) ______ (1,200-2,000)**
Weeks
(WEEKS, 1971) ____ 2,290/3,490*
Jodry
(SUN, 1972)______ 1,952 190 10
Odell
(UNIV, 1973)______ 4,000
Kirby, Adams
(B.P., 1974)______ (1,600-2,000)**
Moody
(MOODY, 1975) ____ (1,705-2,030-2,505)** 242 12
95 percent 5 percent 
Grossling
(USGS, 1976)______ (1,960-2,200-3,000-5,600)** 182-250** 8
Klemme
(WEEKS, 1976)____ 1,600 
Parent, Linden
(Institute of Gas
Technology,
1977) __________ 2,000 
DELPHI
(Desprairies) (Institut
francais du
Petrole, 1977) _____ 2,200/2,500** 
Moody
(MOODY, 1978) ____ 2,030 300 15 
Nehring
(RAND [CIA], 1979) __ _____(1,700-2,300)**___________________^
* Estimator gives primary, then secondary values. 
** Estimator gives range, sometimes with a mean value.
Figure 3 Major published estimates of world oil resources. 
(Barrels are calculated in billions.)
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and "secondary" recovery respectively. Values in brackets 
correspond to a range of values, sometimes with a mean 
value. Altogether, there have been about two dozen 
estimates since 1946.
Some experts have used similar tables to analyze 
potential trends of world oil resources estimates. Odell 
(1973) for instance, has made a curve, which is well- 
known, of the linear regression of the estimates, and has 
shown that the estimates generally increased with time. In 
addition, it is possible to see from such graphs, even add- 
ing the most recent estimates, that the uncertainty or, one 
might say, the spreading of the estimates did not decrease 
with time. In fact, if we take all the values listed in figure 3, 
the picture appears as shown in figure 4. Even if many 
values tend to increase, it is in fact difficult to draw a 
regression line through the estimates. At best, there ap- 
pears to be a magic line or "magic figure" of 2,000 billion 
barrels, at which many of the estimates are "knocking."
Analyzing these various estimates after a careful 
reading of the documents, we can summarize thus:
In 1947, there was the introduction of estimates of off- 
shore oil which first boosted the estimates (Pratt, 1947; 
Levorsen, 1949).
In 1958, Weeks introduced the first estimate of broad 
regional distribution.
In 1962, Hubbert introduced the first "estimate of 
estimates."
In 1965, Hendricks estimated "discoverable" oil in- 
place.
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Figure 4 Evolution of estimates of ultimate world oil resources. 
(Barrels are calculated in billions.)
In 1969, analyzing previous estimates, Hubbert stated 
that the uncertainty of world estimates was between 1,350 
and 2,000 billion barrels.
In 1970, Moody stressed the importance of giant and 
super giant fields.
In 1975, Moody published what remains one of the 
best (and most influential) estimates, and introduced prob- 
ability distribution.
In 1977, the extremely important DELPHI study was 
issued (Desprairies, 1977).
In 1978, Nehring was the first to disclose the method 
and the data used to perform an estimate.
Concerning the study by Nehring, it is worth pointing 
out that previous estimates were, in fact, calling mostly 
upon our "faith," because if the method was, at best, sug- 
gested, the data used to arrive at the estimates were never 
cited. Here we refer to world estimates and not estimates 
for the United States, for which the situation was dif- 
ferent. This means that from the scientific point of view, it 
was not possible to check whether world assessments were 
good or not.
As a next step, it is interesting to investigate the 
relative independence of these various estimates. 
Levorsen's, for instance, is not independent because he 
combined those of Pogue (1946) and of Weeks (1948), and 
added the offshore estimate of Pratt (1947). Weeks has 
made a lot of estimates but, of course, they are mere revi- 
sions and are not independent of each other. Hendricks 
was apparently independent. Hubbert, as we mentioned, 
made the first "estimate of estimates." This last process has 
more or less continued until the present day. To cut short 
this long story, figure 5 summarizes, using the horizontal 
axis for independent estimates and arrows for connections, 
a thirty-year period, from 1946 to 1976, for which we have 
found about six independent world oil resource estimates.
Then, in 1977, the very important DELPHI study by 
Pierre Desprairies of the French Petroleum Institute was 
published. It was prepared for the Conservation Commis- 
sion of the World Energy Conference held September 
1977. More than forty experts were consulted: 27 answered 
the first set of questions, 22 of them confirmed or revised 
their answers in the second round. We can, however, ques- 
tion, by referring to the above, whether all of these 22 
estimates are really complete, independent estimates.
Figure 6 summarizes the main findings of the 
DELPHI study. Ultimate world oil resources remaining to 
be produced (to which must be added 300 billion barrels of 
past cumulative production, to make these figures com- 
parable with others given previously) would be 1,900 
billion barrels, excluding deep offshore and polar areas, 
and 2,200 billion barrels if these are included, assuming the 
recovery rate were raised from today's average 25 percent 
to about 40 percent at the end of the century. (In fact, the
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Figure 5 Source relationships between oil resources estimates.
Ultimate world oil resources 
remaining to be produced 
("consensus")
1.900X109 bbl(260Gt)
or
2.200X 109 bbl (300 Gt) including 
deep-offshore and polar areas
  45 percent offshore
  Recovery increasing from present 25 percent to 40 percent in the year 
2000
  Increasing contribution of enhanced recovery: 55 percent of gross 
increase in 2000
  slowing down of annual rate of growth of reserves: Back to 
20xl09 bbl/yrin2000___________________________
Figure 6 Main findings of the WEC-DELPHi study published 
for the 1977 Conference.
limits imposed on the study were the year 2020 and a pro- 
duction cost of less than $20 per barrel, in 1976 dollars.) 
These are the values proposed by the estimator. The 
DELPHI study also concluded that the increasing contribu- 
tion of enhanced recovery would account for 50 percent of 
the gross increase in the year 2000. By that year, the annual 
rate of growth of reserves would slow down to 20 billion 
barrels per year.
It is interesting to look at the degree of consensus. In 
the following paragraphs, we use billion metric tons of oil, 
which were the original units of the DELPHI study, instead 
of billions of barrels. In figure 7, the 27 "first" answers are 
plotted  each respondent number appearing on the ver- 
tical scale and his corresponding individual estimate on the 
horizontal scale. It may be seen that the answers, in fact, 
cover a broad range, from about 170 billion to 750 billion
tons (the latter is an average for the 550 to 950-billion-ton 
range). It is interesting to remark that, even when extreme 
estimates are eliminated, the estimates of the consensus 
group (fig. 7), show some appreciable disagreement on the 
potential future role of deep offshore and polar areas. 
Figure 8 shows another way of presenting the same results.
Finally, in relation to our IIASA studies to assess poten- 
tial future world oil production, it is interesting to try to 
establish values on regional distributions of world oil 
resources according to the DELPHI study experts. Figure 9 
shows, in a similar fashion to figure 8, the answers for 
North America. We find the known phenomenon of the 
broad ranges of estimates (answers re-converted to billion 
barrels in figures 8 and 9). And figure 10 shows for major 
regions the minimum estimates, the maximum estimates 
and the averages for the totality of answers from the ex- 
perts, or only for the answers of the "consensus" in the 
global range of 200 to 300 billion tons. The 1975 Moody 
values and the 1978 Nehring values fall into the same 
ranges, and more especially into the consensus ranges. 
However, this no longer applies to the range of estimates, 
generally and understandably much broader if all the 
answers are taken into account. But even in the consensus 
range, and although agreement on the global value is plus 
or minus 20 percent, there is no clear convergence of 
estimates at the regional level. The ratios between higher 
and lower values in the 200 to 300 Gt range vary from 2 to 
4. Estimates of socialist countries, which do not publish 
statistics, are difficult to evaluate. For the Middle East, the 
factor of 2 represents a very big difference of 80 billion 
tons, which is roughly equivalent to present known world 
reserves. The highest disagreement of opinion among the 
experts is related to deep offshore and polar areas. It is fair 
to say that the DELPHI study in fact occurred about at the 
turning point: concerning deep offshore, the original op- 
timism of the mid-1970s has now been succeeded by an (ex- 
aggerated?) pessimism.
This is where we stand with regional estimates for 
world oil resources and the material with which we are 
working. It seems appropriate to say that, from the scien- 
tific point of view, our knowledge is very, very poor.
ASSESSMENTS OF WORLD UNCONVENTIONAL 
OIL RESOURCES
We can assess estimates of unconventional oil 
resources in the world by saying that the situation is still 
much worse than for conventional oil resources.
True, there are some very large deposits, more or less 
well known and curiously, located on the "oil ring" 
described by Nehring (1978) (Athabasca Tar Sands, Col- 
orado Oil Shales, Orinoco Heavy Crudes). The aggregate 
in-the-ground resources of these very large deposits are 
considerable, at least 800 billion tons, of which about 150
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Figure 7 Analysis of answers to DELPHI questions. Shaded area: 18 answers regarded by Desprairies (1977) as representing a consen- 
sus. Values on the left are figures without polar and offshore areas, where applicable; values on the right include polar and offshore 
areas.
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Figure 8 World oil resources remaining to be produced (DELPHI 
study). Vertical scale: number of answers for the various ranges 
of the horizontal scale; shaded area: 18 answers regarded by 
Desprairies (1977) as representing a consensus.
billion tons are presently considered to be recoverable (fig. 
11), which has to be compared to the 900 billion tons of
150 200 250 300 350400 450 500 
109 bbl
Figure 9 Ultimate oil recovery in United States and Canada 
(DELPHI study). (Estimates are calculated in billions of barrels.)
conventional oil originally in place, if we accept the 
DELPHI values. But our main concern is to answer this 
question: what may possibly exist at a global level beyond 
these huge deposits; that is, what is the potential regional
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RANGE PROJECTED IN 
ALL VALUES
VALUES
"IN CONSENSUS" 
200-300 Gt RANGE*
MINI- MAXI- AVER- MINI- MAXI- AVER- 
MUM MUM AGE MUM MUM AGE
Socialist countries
U.S.A. and Canada _ _
Middle East and North Africa 
Africa South of Sahara
Western Europe
Latin America
East and South Asia (includes 
Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand)
Deep offshore and polar 
regions
77
6
54. 
?
5
7
5
0
1
7
,8
7
9
5
96.3
50
300 
40
22
55
30
230
54
78
109. 
11
11
77
15
38
9
5
.1 
3
7
9
1
7
40.3
15.6
76
4
5
12.5
6
0
83
45
156
13.4
22
36.9
25
50
54
76
101.
8
11
70
13
71
9
1
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8
1
9
6
7
*Of the 18 values in the 200 to 300 Gt Range, four do not give details 
by regions.
Figure 10 Regional distribution of DELPHI estimates. (Figures 
are calculated in gigatons.)
distribution of these unconventional oil resources? 
Because of a lack of economic interest until now (let us 
recall: reserves must be profitable), very little effort has 
been made to assess these unconventional resources in 
most countries.
As we showed at our 1976 IIASA-UNITAR Conference 
on the "Future Supply of Nature-Made Petroleum and 
Gas", sources of global data are generally very few and 
very old (Barnea and others, 1977). Contrary to what was 
expected, the first United Nations sponsored Conference 
on Heavy Crudes and Tar Sands held at Edmonton, Alber- 
ta in 1979 (United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research, 1981) did not really improve the data situation.
Most improvements were related to Canada and, to a lesser 
extent, to the United States and Venezuela. Many of us, in 
the energy community, had expected that a serious re- 
assessment would get started after the 1973-74 oil crisis. 
Apparently (we will come back to this matter later) and un- 
fortunately, this did not happen, except in the three above- 
mentioned countries plus, possibly, in a very few other 
places.
That is why the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis has launched its own survey of un- 
conventional oil resources, through questionnaires and in- 
terviews. Our study is about midway so that it is premature 
to present final results and (or) conclusions. However, 
some of our progress will be reported.
Heavy Crudes and Tar Sands
At the already-mentioned international conference in 
Edmonton, Meyer and Dietzman of the U.S. Geological 
Survey presented a global estimate of resources and 
possibly recoverable reserves of heavy crudes and tar sands 
(fig. 12). Recovery rates for tar sands were generally very 
conservatively estimated at 10 percent or less (paper given 
in June 1979).
We, at IIASA, consider these figures somewhat 
misleading inasmuch as they aggregate rather good 
data for Canada, the U.S.A., and Central America 
(essentially Venezuela)  with poor to very poor data for 
the other regions.
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Figure 11 Fossil fuel reserves and resources. (Estimates are given in billions of tons; GTep = 
gigatonnes (billions of tons) of oil equivalent.)
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MEDIUM HEAVY 
CRUDE OILS CRUDE OILS DEPOSITS' 
20<°API<25 "API < 20
TOTAL
Canada
U.S.A.
Middle America
South America
Europe
Africa
Middle East
USSR/Asia
Total
119
2,271
108
8,376
154
4,197
32,759
660
48,664
69
2,254
331
5,654
734
89
3,528
97
12,747
333,010
2,512
100,012
175
16
435,731
333,198
7,057
439
114,033
6
4,461
36,287
773
497,122
 In this table Meyer uses the word "deposits" to refer to crude oil which does not occur in 
conventional reservoirs.
Figure 12 Estimate of heavy crude and tar sand reserves (106 
barrels) (from Meyer and Dietzman, 1979).
It is interesting to point out that, in known areas and 
the ones, in fact, where knowledge has increased further, 
there has generally been an increase in the estimates.
Athabasca tar sands: 627 billion barrels estimated in 
1976 (Canada, Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Resources, 
1977); 869 billion barrels estimated in 1979 by Mossop and 
others (Alberta Research Council) who referred to a 1978 
study by Outtrim and Evans.
Lloydminster (Alberta) heavy crudes: Two prob- 
abilistic estimates, one for 1976 and one for 1979, are 
shown in figure 13. See also McCrossan and others (1979).
100r—
50
EXPLANATION
—— 1976 estimate of oil in 
place in Alberte and 
Saskatchewan. 
(Source: Oil Sands 
and Heavy Oils: The 
Prospects: Ceneda 
EMR Report EP 77-2)
—— 1979 estimete of oil in 
drilled and mepped 
arees. Alberta 
(Source: McCrossan 
end others, 1979)
— — 1979 speculation on oil 
in Alberte, including 
unexplored areas. 
(Source: McCrossan 
end others, 1979)
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Figure 13 Lloydminster-area heavy oils.
California tar sands: Estimates have increased from 
270-323 million barrels in 1965 (Ball Associates, 
Monograph 12) to 966 million barrels in 1979 (Hallmark 
paper given at International Conference, Edmonton) 
through the addition of new deposits, not including two 
large but conjectural deposits.
Utah tar sands: Estimates have grown from 2.0-4.3 
billion barrels in 1965 (Ball Associates, Monograph 12) to 
22.4-29.2 billion barrels in 1979 (Ritzma, 1974 and 1979).
An important question is, of course: Can this upward 
revising be expected to be a general phenomenon? That is, 
were deposits very conservatively estimated in the past 
(sometimes, a long time ago, as much as a few decades)
and will more recent and better assessments upgrade them? 
It is premature, and unfortunately not possible, to give a 
definite answer to this question. However, three examples 
outside North America, among the few we have at hand, 
give some preliminary information.
In Madagascar, an unpublished 1954 British 
Petroleum study (Kent, 1954) that was used in Meyer and 
Dietzman's 1979 assessment had estimated tar sand 
resources at 1.79 billion barrels; but a 1962 survey by An- 
drianasolo and others for the Malagasy Oil Company ar- 
rived at a possible estimate of 22 billion barrels or 3 billion 
tons.
For Italy, the 1979 Meyer and Dietzman estimate 
referred to 50 million tons (about 360 million barrels) of 
recoverable heavy oil. The most recent Azienda Generale 
Italiana Petroli (AGIP) assessment by Dalla Casa and 
others mentions 350 million tons of heavy oil originally in 
place in developed fields and 1,200 million tons in 
discovered but not yet developed fields. Assuming a low- 
recovery factor of 10 percent because of technical dif- 
ficulties, this represents about 155 million tons or 1,100 
billion barrels of recoverable oil.
For Peru, based on previous estimates, Meyer and 
Dietzman reported 60 million barrels of recoverable 
reserves. But at the Edmonton International Conference, 
A. A. Pardo (Petroleos del Peru) mentioned that in-place 
reserves of heavy crudes for the Maranon Basin are 
estimated at 1,500 million barrels. A low 10 percent 
recovery rate would yield 150 million barrels.
The few examples cited above illustrate, if at all 
necessary, the difficulties but also the potential for evolu- 
tion of such reserves and resources estimates of heavy 
crudes and tar sands.
Oil Shales
World oil-shale resources were given by J. R. Donnell 
(1977) at the 1976 IIASA-UNITAR Conference, as shown in 
figures 14 and 15. In fact, most of these data originate 
from the excellent 1965 U.S. Geological Survey Circular 
523 by Duncan and Swanson, itself a collection of old to 
very old data. The various tables by Meyer, Duncan,
CONTINENTS
RECOVERABLE
UNDER PRESENT MARGINAL AND 
CONDITIONS SUBMARGINAL
Africa _ _
Asia
Australia and New Zealand _________ 
Europe _ _ _ _
North America
South America
10
24
30
80
50
90
84
1
46
2,120
750
Total 190 3,091
Source: By J. R. Donnell; modified from Duncan and Swanson.
Figure 14 Known oil shale resources of the world land areas 
(billions of barrels).
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SMALL RESOURCES MEDIUM RESOURCES LARGE RESOURCES
Chile
Turkey
Austria _ _
Malagasy
Poland
10«m 3
3
3
7
3
3
106 tons
1
4
6
10' barrels
18.9 
18.9 
44.0 
18.9 
18.9
106 barrels
8 
32
48
South Africa
Argentina
Australia
Bulgaria _
Spain
Luxembourg __
Thailand
Yugoslavia _ _
Morocco
106m 3
20 
60 
40 
20 
40 
70 
110 
40 
130 
30
106 tons
74
106 barrels
125.8 
377.4 
251.6 
125.8 
251.6 
440.3 
691.9 
251.6 
817.7 
188.7
106 barrels
592
West Germany _ 
Burma
Brazil
Canada
People's Republic 
of China
Zaire Kinshasa _
TT C A
Italy (Sicily) _
Sweden _ _
ITCCT?
106 m ! 106 barrels
320 2,012.8 
320 2,012.8 
127,320 800,842.8 
7,000 44,030.0
4,430 27,864.7 
16,000 100,640.0 
250,000 2,000,220.0 
160 1,006.4 
5,600 35,224.0 
400 2,516.0 
17,000 112,591.0
Figure 15 Estimates of oil shale resources by country.
Swanson, Donnell, and others are, in fact, the first ten- 
tative assessments of the global existence and (or) 
availability of unconventional oil.
Our HASA survey permits an additional perspective; 
continuing again with a few examples:
In France, in 1954 there were 440 million barrels of 
known oil shale resources according to J. R. Donnell 
(1977). A three-year study (1974-1978) by R. Breton and 
others (1978) included 35 core drillings over a broad area 
east of Paris plus 10 core drillings in a selected area within 
that broad area. The broad area survey indicated about 
seven billion barrels, and the intensive survey of the 
smaller area identified more than 400 million barrels with 
contents between 40 and 100 liters of oil per ton of rock 
(restricted to an overburden ratio of about 2).
In Morocco, Duncan and Swanson (1965) gave no oil 
shale estimate; but in 1974, A. K. Matveyev estimated 
about 600 million barrels. Today, known resources are 
estimated at 1.6 billion barrels and total resources can 
possibly reach 5 billion barrels, according to recent HAS A 
survey findings.
In contrast to these two important upward revisions, 
our survey has also revealed downward revisions, such as 
for Italy, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. The 
final figure for Italy is not yet known, but it is foreseen, on 
the basis of the HASA survey, that it will be lower than the
previous figure of 35 billion barrels. For Great Britain, 
where data are most uncertain, and interest is very low, a 
pilot study in the Kimmeridge Clay apparently downgrades 
occurrences. For New Zealand, no figures are available, 
but a statement, based on 20 core drillings, reports that 
resources are smaller than previously estimated and are of 
no economic importance (personal commun., IIASA 
Survey).
Most studies indicate that at present there is little or no 
interest in oil shale resources. In fact, it is clear that most if 
not all the deposits are relatively smaller and of a lesser oil 
content than the Colorado oil shale deposits, and that 
probably no effort will be made elsewhere before the 
United States really begins to exploit their huge oil shale 
reserves, apart maybe from the special case of Brazil.
THE THREE PATHS TO COSTLY OIL
There is no doubt that the cost of oil (we are not 
speaking here of its sale price!) shows a rising trend 
regardless of what production route is followed. We sum- 
marize this in figure 16.
The first path is the historical one: the oil industry, 
especially onshore, shifts production progressively from 
supergiant and giant fields to medium-size fields and, 
finally, to small fields. The supergiants or fields larger
GIANT FIELD MEDIUM FIELDS
(5-109 bbl) 
(700-106 t)
(500 
(70
106 bbl) 
106 t)
50 
(7
106 bbl) 
106 t)
ON-SHORE OFF-SHORE
SMALL FIELDS
(5-106 bbl) 
(0,7 -106 t)
DEEP-OFFSHORE
"GOOD" OIL 
(80-25° API)
DIFFICULT OIL 
(25-10° API)
•"BAD" OIL
(10-7° API, TAR SANDS) 
KEROGEN, OIL SHALES)
Figure 16 The three paths to costly oil.
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U.S.A. __________ 2,219 Venezuela 41 Burma
Canada 
Mexico _ 
Algeria _ 
Argentina 
Indonesia 
Brazil _ 
Iran _____
241 India ____________ 40
174 United Kingdom ______ 34
Iraq _____________ 29101 
73 Libya 
61
20 Japan ____________ 14
Abu Dhabi _________ 19 Malaysia __________ 13
Peru _____________ 19 Turkey ___________ 13
Trinidad __________ 19 Italy 12
Germany __________ 25
54 Saudi Arabia ________ 24
53 Yugoslavia _________ 22
28 Nigeria ___________ 18 Austria ___________ 11
Netherlands _________ 17
Syria _____________ 17
Egypt ____________ 15
Australia __________ 10
Colombia __________ 10
Pakistan __________ 10
Figure 17 Summary of world rig activity in 1978 (excluding socialist areas), given as number of rigs by country. Besides the 3,456 rigs 
listed, another 30 countries have from 1 to 9 rigs, for a total of 120.
14000 +
Oil rigs 
by region
North America ' _
Latin America _
Europe
Middle East
Africa
Asia
South Pacific
Total
Number 
operating
2,460
402
142
193
182
186
13
3,578
Prospective Areas in 
square miles 
by Grossling (1976) by Ivanhoe
4,421,400 
4,804,600 
1,394,000 
1,344,800 
5,034,590
1,819,300
1 Includes United States and Canada but not Mexico. Total number of rigs by region does not 
necessarily agree with enumeration by country.
Figure 18 Number of rigs by regions and by estimated size.
than 700 million tons or 5 billion barrels were eagerly 
searched for all over the world and the giants, those larger 
than 70 million tons or 500 million barrels, were both the 
most profitable, and still account for more than 70 percent 
of world oil production.
Small fields already account for 15 percent of United 
States production. It is sometimes argued that this could 
only happen in the United States because of the special 
situation where the wealth underground belongs to the 
owner of the surface: thousands and thousands of farmers 
have taken the risk; a few became millionaires. This only 
means that in other countries  if the same result is to be 
achieved  other or new types of incentives will have to be 
found. We are confident that, since it will take a long time 
before a substitute for oil is found, these incentives will in- 
deed be developed. Nationalized oil companies will prob- 
ably be the first to benefit from them.
A review of world petroleum history makes clear that 
there is an enormous variation in the size of drilling 
efforts, as brilliantly shown by B. F. Grossling in his arti- 
cle, "Window on Oil" (1976). Regarding the prospects for 
finding more oil, we at IIASA agree qualitatively with 
Grossling, but not "quantitatively" in the sense that we 
find him somewhat optimistic. But we are convinced that 
there is still a lot of oil to be found.
Curiously, it is interesting  but somewhat disappoint- 
ing to see how the Western World has reacted to the 
1973-74 crisis. This is illustrated by the data for rig activity 
(figs. 17 and 18) and for exploratory drilling completions 
(fig. 19). Two conclusions can be drawn: (1) There is a con- 
tinuous and even increasing  difference between drilling 
by the United States and Canada on the one hand and the
12000 •
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4000 •
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EASTERN HEMISPHERE
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Figure 19 Free world total exploratory well completions.
rest of the Western World on the other hand: and (2) only 
the United States and Canada have dramatically increased 
their search for oil and gas since the oil crisis.
From the DELPHI study, a tentative supply curve can 
be drawn for the 300 billion tons of oil remaining to be 
produced (fig. 20). Incidentally, a similar curve was men- 
tioned by Shell representatives in a May 9, 1979 lecture by 
K. R. Williams. This means that a good part, about two- 
thirds of these 300 billion tons of oil, was considered to be 
producible at less than $12 per barrel (in 1976 dollars), 
with corresponding investments of less than $10,000 per 
barrel per day capacity. Let us recall that the greater part 
of oil today (in 1979) is still produced at costs probably not 
higher than $2 per barrel per day.
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Figure 20 World oil supply curve, according to DELPHI study 
(1977).
For these reasons, we think that, on a global basis, this 
path will remain the preferred one in coming decades, and 
will probably be used reasonably far into the 21st Century. 
It can provide sufficient time  taking into account that 
world consumption and (or) production of oil will increase 
much slower than previously forecast  for a timely 
penetration of unconventional oil into the market, pro- 
vided a few countries pave the way; for example, the 
United States with the Synfuel program and Canada with 
tar sands.
The second, or offshore path, began with a 
technological extension of onshore exploration and pro- 
duction, and was further encouraged for political reasons. 
The North Sea was especially suitable for offshore 
development because of its highly appealing political 
stability. Here the most impressive technological progress 
has been achieved. Unfortunately, the progress has been 
accompanied by parallel and dramatic cost increases 
($10,000 to $12,000 per barrel per day capacity). 
Moreover, there is some disappointment with U.S. Atlan- 
tic offshore explorations, for instance with regard to the 
Baltimore Canyon. This, together with discouraging 
results up to now in deep offshore areas, has somewhat 
slowed down the race to deeper and deeper water, and has 
led some experts to revise downward their previous hopes
for deep offshore potential. Higher and higher costs are 
obvious, but the resources  if any are elusive. Curiously, 
this path is counter to the first: because of increasing costs, 
unfortunately, going deeper and deeper obliges oil 
operators to concentrate only on the biggest deposits. That 
means that giant fields are needed for normal offshore 
production (as mentioned above for North Sea "marginal" 
fields) and probably that supergiants are needed for deep 
offshore production, unless new production methods are 
developed.
The third path would be from "good oil" to "bad oil" 
(oil shales) passing through "difficult oil" (heavy crudes 
and tar sands). Such a production evolution is highly 
technology-dependent and will really occur  if it occurs at 
all  as a result of a political determination and only in a 
few countries at first. These few countries, including 
presumably Canada and the United States, have the double 
incentive of high oil consumption and imports and of own- 
ing the largest deposits presently known. They also have 
the advantage of possessing oil producers competent at the 
highest technological levels. A problem whose solution is 
not yet clear, but which could be highly important at the 
world level, is to understand whether path 3 will resemble 
path 1 or path 2 as far as sizes of deposits are concerned. 
Because of the immature state of development of the 
technology of "difficult" and "bad" oil, it is hard to an- 
ticipate whether only large to very large deposits will be 
producible or whether small deposits will also be produci- 
ble, possibly through different methods. With our present 
knowledge, investments for path 3 are the highest among 
the various steps of the three paths: for example, $25,000 
to $30,000 per barrel per day capacity for new tar sand 
projects in Alberta.
These very high capital costs (for production from tar 
sands, deep offshore, oil shales, etc.) and the huge size of 
deposits and (or) production facilities point to a necessary 
and permanent role for major oil companies, with the hope 
that the necessary steps will be taken to encourage them, or 
simply to keep them alive.
CONCLUSION
We are hopeful that the necessary amounts of liquid 
fuels can be produced, according to our curve proposed in 
figure 1, with a progressive  and well-planned  penetra- 
tion of unconventional oil. (We do not underestimate the 
possible role of liquids from coal, but this question is out- 
side the scope of this paper.)
Two final comments by way of conclusion: 
1. The three paths that lead to costly oil also lead, in 
fact, to a new dimension in oil history, because of 
the dramatic increases not only in costs in monetary 
value but also in costs of natural (and human) 
resources. Impacts on, and requirements for, other
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natural (and human) resources will become greater 
and greater for producing these new sources of 
energy. So much so, in fact, that energy resources 
can no longer be considered in isolation from other 
resources such as water, land, materials, and man- 
power, these same resources being discussed during 
this U.S. Geological Survey Centennial Sym- 
posium. To understand these systems aspects bet- 
ter, we have developed the WELMM approach 
(Water, Energy, Land, Materials and Manpower) 
at IIASA and summarized our opinion in the slogan: 
Man does not consume energy, but WELMMITE. A 
lot remains to be done to achieve a better 
understanding in this direction. 
2. Much will depend on what will happen in the next 
decade in North America. If the North Americans 
are successful, their efforts will open the way to 
new resources, not only for North America, but all 
over the world. It is with some melancholy that I 
must confess that Western Europe, the region 
depending the most on oil and, unfortunately, on 
imported oil, has restricted itself to a wait-and-see 
position.
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